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Abstract
Relativistic protocols have been proposed to overcome certain impossibility results in classical and
quantum cryptography. In such a setting, one takes the location of honest players into account, and
uses the signalling limit given by the speed of light to constraint the abilities of dishonest agents.
However, composing such protocols with each other to construct new cryptographic resources is
known to be insecure in some cases. Tomake general statements about such constructions, a
composable framework formodelling cryptographic security inMinkowski space is required.
Here, we introduce a framework for performing such amodular security analysis of classical and
quantum cryptographic schemes inMinkowski space. As an application, we show that (1) fair and
unbiased coin ﬂipping can be constructed from a simple resource called channel with delay; (2)
biased coin ﬂipping, bit commitment and channel with delay through any classical, quantum or
post-quantum relativistic protocols are all impossible without further setup assumptions; (3) it is
impossible to securely increase the delay of a channel, given several short-delay channels as
ingredients. Results (1) and (3) imply in particular the non-composability of existing relativistic bit
commitment and coin ﬂipping protocols.
1. Introduction
1.1.Motivation
As global efforts for quantum communication in space boomwith theﬁrst satellite implementations of
quantumkey distribution [1–3], it becomes crucial to develop the theoretical tools to guarantee that these
communications are secure. In order to do so, wemust take into account not only quantum effects but also
relativistic ones. Ourmanuscript is the ﬁrst to provide a complete framework for composable security analysis of
quantumand post-quantum cryptography in relativistic settings. As aﬁrst application of this tool set, we prove
several construction and impossibility results.
Composability.Tounderstand composability andwhy itmatters, it is helpful to look at a classical example. In
modern chess, the Elo ranking system is vulnerable toman-in-the-middle attacks (MITMs), where aweak player
could play two online games in parallel against stronger players, playing a different colour in each game, and
simply forward themoves of the opponents to each other. At the end, the player will lose one of the games and
win the other (or tie in both games), but given that the Elo system favours lower-rated players, the attacker ends
upwith a net gain of points, independently of the result. Such a vulnerability could not be detected by a stand-
alone security analysis (which checkswhat happens if the games are considered individually), but only by a
composable security analysis, which considers the possibility of games being used in amodular fashion, as part
of a larger strategy. Similarly, several knownproposals for quantum cryptographic protocols that exploit
relativistic constraints are proven insecure by our paper.
Cryptography as a resource theory.We follow the approach of Abstract Cryptography [4], which views
cryptography as a resource theory: a protocol between some players constructs a resource (e.g. a system that
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produces a random coin ﬂip) from some other resource (e.g.a system that allows bit commitment)5. Here we
address construction of resources in relativistic quantum cryptography, and security deﬁnitions that are robust
under composition of constructions. By ‘relativistic’wemean simple special relativity:Minkowski space–time
with limited signalling speed.
A cryptographic resource: bit commitment.To illustrate the need for a composable analysis of relativistic
quantum cryptography, we focus on bit commitment protocols, which have attracted interest in recent years
[6–9]. Bit commitment is a crucial cryptographic primitive, fromwhichwe can construct oblivious transfer6
[10], multi-party computation (see footnote 5) [10], coinﬂipping [12], and zero-knowledge proofs [13, 14].
A bit commitment protocol () between two players (say Alice and Bob) typically involves two phases. In
the commit phase, Alice commits to a bit  { }a 0, 1 with Bob by exchanging informationwith him. In the open
phase, Alice chooses to open her commitment to Bob and reveals her bit to him through an exchange of
information. Intuitively speaking, security of bit commitment has three requirements.
Hiding:whenAlice is honest, Bob has no information about a before the open phase.
Binding:whenBob is honest, Alicemust not be able to change the value of a between the commit and open
phases without himdetecting hermalicious behavior.
Complete:honestAlice always has thepossibility of openingher commitment, and in this case, Bob always receivesa.
These requirements can be formalized under different security deﬁnitions. Not allmodels of security of 
are composable: for example the ò-weakly binding deﬁnition of [8] is not. There, Alice is allowed to commit to a
bit without knowing its value, which if used as a subroutine in a coin ﬂipping protocol, would allowdishonest
players to perfectly correlate the coin ﬂips fromdifferent coins. Similar weaknesses in current deﬁnitions of
relativistic bit commitment have been exploited to show that using these protocols as subroutine in a larger
cryptosystem is insecure [15, appendix A]. In this work, wemodel security such that the constructed 
resource can be securely used in arbitrary context. Let usﬁrst review some known results.
1.2. Previous results
Impossiblity of classical bit commitment. In 2001, Canetti and Fischlin showed that constructing a  resource
without any setup assumptions is impossible [16]. They proved this for a classical non-relativistic setting
through a classicalMITM.Consider a cheating Alice simultaneously running two  protocols: onewith Bob,
inwhich she is the committer, and onewithCharlie, inwhich she is the receiver. She can commit toCharlie’s bit
with Bob by simply forwarding theirmessages to each other during the commit phase. Note that the proof from
[16] is restricted to the classical setting, and does not imply the impossibility of constructing a  resource in
either quantumor relativistic settings.
Impossibility of quantum bit commitment.Using a stand-alone deﬁnitionwith information-theoretic
security,Mayers, and Lo andChau [17–19] independently showed between 1996 and 1997 that no secure
quantumbit commitment protocol can be constructedwithout further assumptions (for example regarding the
operations that (dishonest) parties can performon their systems), because due toUhlmann’s theorem, if Bob
cannot distinguish between the commitment to a 0 or a 1, then there exists a unitary onAlice’s system allowing
her to change the commitment from0 to 1.
Possibility results.Positive results are obtainedby either restricting the adversary’s capabilities ormaking extra
setup assumptions. For example, alongwith their impossiblity result, Canetti andFischlin also show that a 
resource canbe constructed ifwe assumea common reference string (CRS) sharedbetween theplayers and
computationally boundedplayers [16]. In the quantumcase,Unruh showed in [20] that if the adversary has bounded
quantummemory, bit commitment that is composable in certain restricted settings is possible7. In [21]Unruhalso
shows that everlastingquantumbit commitment is achievable, ifwe assume signature cards as trusted setup.
Relativistic protocols. In the hope of avoiding such attacks withoutmaking unrealistic setup assumptions or
unproven assumptions on the adversary’s capabilities, one turns to relativistic protocols and imposes relativistic
causal constraints on agents located inMinkowski space—no-signalling between space-like separated agents
and amaximumpropagation speed for signals. An example is Kent’s 2012 relativistic  protocol [7], which is
immune to theMayers-Lo-Chau attack, since the sender splits into two space-like separated agents who can no
5
For comparison, in the universal Composability (UC) framework [5], resources correspond to ideal functionalities.
6
Constructing oblivious transfer (and thusmulti-party computation) frombit commitment requires agents to have access to quantum
operations [10]. An alternativemodel and construction of (delegated) quantummulti-party computation has been proposed in [11].
7
Themodel used in [20] does not guarantee security when a protocol is composedwith itself. There is thus no contradictionwith the
impossibility proof for bit commitment in the bounded storagemodel in this work, which shows that any bit commitment protocol run in
parallel with another instance of itself is insecure.
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longer perform suitable unitaries on their joint systems. Like other relativistic  protocols, this protocol
implements a timed commitment which is secure only within a timewindow given by the time taken by light to
travel between remote agents.However, it only satisﬁes a non-composable, weakly-binding security deﬁnition
[8]. Aswewill see, this protocol is susceptible to aMITMand therefore cannot be securely run as a subroutine in
arbitrary protocols8.
Composability of relativistic protocols. In relativistic settings, the existing negative results are obtained by
analyzing speciﬁc examples of protocols and attacks where composition fails [8, 15]. However, without an
overall coherent framework formodelling composability in relativistic cryptography, it is impossible to obtain
general positive and negative results.
1.3.Overview and scope of our results
In this workwe introduce a framework formodelling composable cryptographic security in the presence of
classical, quantumand no-signalling adversaries, and apply it to prove newpositive and negative results in
relativistic quantum cryptography.We do this bymodelling the abstract information-processing systems of the
Abstract Cryptography framework [4] asCausal Boxes [22], whichwe instantiate withMinkowski space–time.
Our framework can also be applied to situationswhere agents exchange a superposition of different numbers of
messages in a superposition of orders in time, and provides an operational formalism for studying indeﬁnite
causal structures.We note that themodel of computation used in theUC framework [20]does not support
Minkowski space–time, soUC cannot be used to analyze relativistic protocols.
We analyse three cryptographic resources, deﬁned in section 2. Coinﬂipping ( , including biased
variations) and bit commitment () are standard in the composable security literature, though in this work our
formalization involves space–time—inputs and outputs are produced at certain locations inMinkowski space.
We also introduce a channel with delay (), which ismotivated by the fact that in relativistic bit commitment
protocols, the commitment is automatically opened after some (predeﬁned) time, thus resembling a more
than a 9. The following results are summarized inﬁgure 1.
Constructibility results.We show that an unbiased coinﬂipping resource  can be constructed from a
channel with delay resource,  (theorem3). For comparison, Blum’s protocol [12], constructs aweaker,
biased10 coinﬂipping resource froma bit commitment resource [23].We provide an explicit protocol to
Figure 1. Summary of our results.We assumeMinkowski space–timewith limited speed of signalling (upper-bounded by the speed of
light). Existing results are represented in black and the new contributions of this paper in blue and red. An arrow * +l means that it
is possible to construct resource + from resource *.When the arrow is crossed, thatmeans that no such construction exists without
further setup assumptions such as shared resources. For example, theorem 3 shows that Coin Flipping between 2 parties can be
securely constructed from aChannel withDelay, and theorem 7, corollaries 5 and 6 show that it is impossible to construct Coin
Flipping (biased or unbiased), Channel withDelay or Bit Commitment between twomutually distrusting parties solely through direct
communication between them. Theorem7 implies that startingwith n channels with delay, it is impossible to construct a channel with
a ‘larger delay’without further setup assumptions. Note that all impossibility results in thisﬁgure hold for any classical, quantumor
relativistic protocol. For  and  , impossibility through classical/quantumprotocols was previously known [16–18] but the
generalisation to the relativistic case is one of the key contributions of this paper.
8
Sharing an authentic channel does not help the players to avoid theMITMattack, since the issue is not a third party intercepting and
changing themessages, but a dishonest player running two protocols in parallel, and forwarding themessages fromone protocol to the
other.
9
Theremay be different ways ofmodeling a relativistic bit commitment resource, e.g. the committermay have the option of aborting before
the commitment is opened, see the discussion in section 2.3.3.
10
Originally, Blum’s protocol constructs an unfair coin ﬂip, inwhich one party can abort after seeing theﬂip [12]. Thismay be transformed
into a biased coin ﬂip if the honest party ﬂips a coin locally when the dishonest party aborts [23].
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construct  from  and prove its security. The proof holds even in the presence of adversaries that are not
bounded by quantumphysics, but only non-signalling constraints.
Impossibility results. In theorem4we show that constructing a (biased) coinﬂipping resource is impossible in
the relativistic settingwithout additional setup assumptions (e.g. the presence of a shared resource such as ).
This result holds even if the players are only bounded by non-signalling constraints11, or if we restrict the
adversary to being computationally bounded or having bounded storage12. Impossibility of bit commitment
follows fromBlum’s construction [12, 23] of  from  (corollary 6), and impossibility of constructing a
channel with delay  follows from theorem 3 (corollary 5).
Since the literature on relativistic bit commitment also studies the case of extending the time duringwhich
such a commitment remains secure, we also look at the task of constructing a channel with a long delay long
frommultiple channels (labelled by i)with shorter delays { }i ishort .We show that this again is impossible
without other setup assumptions than the assumed channels with delays { }i ishort (theorem7). This
impossibility result holds irrespective of whether the protocol is classical, quantumor non-signalling (see
footnote 10), and also holds if the adversary is computationally bounded.
Consequences of these results.Many quantumprotocols have been proposed in the relativistic setting to
circumvent classical impossibility results for  . To the best of our knowledge, none of these protocols have
been successfully used as subroutines in larger cryptosystems (which is themainmotivation for constructing
such primitives), and some attempts to do so are known to be insecure [15, appendix A]. But due to the lack of
composable framework that canmodelMinkowski space, it has been impossible to provewhether composable
constructions of these resources do exist. Our results show that allowing quantum (and even non-signalling (see
footnote 10)) protocols that respect relativistic constraints is not sufﬁcient to construct  ,  , or  without
additional assumptions. This implies that none of the proposed relativistic bit commitment schemes are
composable (e.g. [6–9]). This also extends to the non-relativistic setting (e.g. [24]), since a non-relativistic
protocol corresponds to the special case where all players are in the same position in space (and thus do not have
any constraints on the speed of communication). Our proof also holds against computationally bounded
adversaries, and adversaries with bounded storage, which implies that results in the bounded storagemodel are
not composable either (e.g. [25]).
Another problem considered in the literature on relativistic bit commitment is that of extending the time
duringwhich commitment remains secure. Our results show that this cannot be donewith a composable
deﬁnition of timed relativistic commitment (see the deﬁnition of  in section 2.3 and following discussion),
evenwhen one starts off with arbitrarilymany (composably) secure commitments of shorter duration.Hence
the techniques used in [9, 26] to extend the time of a relativistic bit commitment cannot be used in a composable
way. Just as the previous results, this also holds when the adversary is computationally limited or has bounded
quantummemory.
The framework naturally allows positive results to be proven aswell—bymaking extra setup assumptions.
This approachwas used byCanetti and Fischlin [16]who show that one can construct a  resource assuming a
sharedCRS and computationally bounded players, andUnruh [21], who showed (everlasting) quantumbit
commitment is achievable if we assume signature cards as trusted setup. In this workwe construct a  resource
froma , and leave open the problemofﬁndingweaker assumptions that still allow  or  to be
constructed.
A takeawaymessage from this work is that one cannot achieve  or  simply from relativity or quantum
mechanics without further setup assumptions. This implies that existing quantum and relativistic protocols for
these primitives can not be securely used as subroutines in arbitrary constructions. It is currently unknown
whether there exist assumptionsweaker thanwhat is possible classically to justify the use of such quantumor
relativistic protocols.
1.4. Structure of this paper
In section 2we introduce themodel that we use to prove our results.We provide a pedagogical introduction to
the Abstract Cryptography framework in section 2.1.We give an overview of Causal Boxes instantiatedwith
Minkowski space in section 2.2—a formal presentation of Causal Boxes is given in appendix A. And in
section 2.3we deﬁne the two party resources  , , and  . Our results are then presented in section 3 and
the proofs are given in appendix B. Finally, we conclude in section 4with a discussion of these results.
11
Anon-signalling player can generate non-signalling correlations between their own trusted agents at different locations. Note however
that if wewere to allow two distrusting players (Alice andBob) to generate non-signalling correlations between them, this would have to be
modeled as an extra setup assumption, namely a shared resource.
12
This excludes in particular protocols where players are not necessarily spatially separated, but canmeet at some location, as do the
impossiblity results in the classical case [16].
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2. Framework
2.1. Composable security: the abstract cryptography framework [4]
2.1.1. Resources, converters and distinguishers
Let us review the basics of the abstract cryptography framework [4]. The following is adapted from [27] for the
case of protocols between twomutually distrusting parties (e.g. bit commitment, coin ﬂipping) and has been
simpliﬁed for our purposes.We refer the reader to [4, 27] formore general deﬁnitions and further examples.
Abstract systems.Abstract cryptography views cryptography as a resource theory: a protocol constructs a
resource from some other resource, e.g. Blum’s protocol [12] constructs a coin ﬂipping resource from a bit
commitment resource. In this sectionwe introduce the building blocks of the framework—resources,
converters (e.g. protocols) and a notion of distance (distinguishability) between resources—and in section 2.2
we explain how these objects are instantiatedwithCausal Boxes [22].
A resource* in a two party setting is an (abstract) systemwith interfaces  { }i A B, , each accessible to a user
i (and their trusted agents) providing themwith certain controls. An operation that is performed by a party at
their interface ismodeled as a converter: a systemαwith an outside and an inside interface, the inner interface
connects to an interface i of the resource, and the outer interface becomes the new interface of the resulting
resource.Wewrite *Bi to denote the resource resulting from connectingα to the i interface of*. This is
illustrated inﬁgure 2.
Distinguishing resources.The security of a cryptographic system is quantiﬁed in terms of distinguishability
from a corresponding ideal system (ﬁgure 3). For example, the ideal resource ‘randombit generator’, + , would
be a black box that generates and outputs a uniformly randombit at a time twhich is independent of everything
outside the box. A speciﬁc practical implementation* of this functionality could be a quantumprotocol:
prepare a qubit in a state §  §(∣ ∣ )0 11
2
, measure it in theZ-basis and output themeasurement result at time t.
Treated as black boxes, both resources* and + output a uniformly random classical bit and cannot be
distinguished by an outsider.
Formore complex resources, wemay ask: distinguishability fromwhose perspective?Here, the traditional
notion of an adversary is generalized to an arbitrary distinguisherwhichmodels not only possible adversarial
behaviour but also thewhole environment of a cryptographic protocol/resource. Themainmotivation for
composable security is that a resource remains secure evenwhen it is used as a sub-routine in arbitrary protocols.
While doing so, protocols can in general access all interfaces of the resource and perform information processing
Figure 2. Starting from a resource *, converters B C, and γ construct a new resource + *B C H A A B . The sequences of arrows at the
interfaces between objects represent (arbitrary) rounds of communication. For simplicity, wemay omit the indices, + *BC H , so
that converters to the left of the resource (B C, ) are implicitly connected to Alice’s interface, and converters on the right (γ) are
connected to Bob’s.
Figure 3. Security in terms of distinguishers. Composable security of a real resource is deﬁned in terms of the success probability of a
class of distinguishers (for example computationally bounded or unbounded, classical, quantumor non-signalling) in distinguishing
the real system from the ideal one. A distinguisher,modelling all the environment of a resource, is given black-box access to either the
real or the ideal systems and a complete description of the input–output behaviour of both systems andmust guess which one it was
interacting with by outputting either a 0 or a 1. The distinguishing advantage is then given by the statistical distance between the two
randombits output when interactingwith the real and ideal systems, respectively.
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steps before, after or during the protocol run by the resource under consideration. The distinguishermodels all
such operations. Standard property-based security notions (e.g. a ciphertext is uncorrelated to a plaintext; or
with high probability themessage received is the same as themessage sent) are covered by such a distinguisher-
based notion of security: the ideal systemhas the required property, and if the real systemdoes not, then a
distinguisher will be able to guess withwhich system it is interacting by verifying whether this property holds.
Deﬁnition 1 (Distinguishing advantage [27]).A distinguisher (ﬁgure 3) for two resources* +, is a system 
with two interfaces: an inside interface that connects to all the interfaces of a resource,* or + , and an outside
interface that outputs a single bit: a guess whether it is interactingwith* or + . The advantage of a speciﬁc
distinguisher  is then given by
* +  *  +    ( ) ∣ [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]∣d , Pr 0 Pr 0 ,
where  *( ) is the output of  when interactingwith*.
The distinguishing advantage for a class of distinguishers is deﬁned as
* + * +





( ) ( )d d, sup , .
The distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric on the space of resources satisfying the identity, symmetry and
triangle inequality properties [27]. If a class of distinguishers is such that for every   ,  B  , then the
pseudo-metric is non-increasing under application of the converterα, i.e. - B B( ) ( )d R S d R S, , .
Classes of distinguishers.Changing the power of the distinguisher (e.g. with some computational ormemory
bound, or performing only classical, quantumor non-signalling operations) results in differentmetrics and
different levels of security. For example, if a protocol provides classical computational security, thismeans that
the resource constructedmay be perfectly indistinguishable from an ideal resourcewhen considering only
computationally bounded distinguishers, but they could be easily distinguished using computationally
unbounded (or quantum)distinguishers. This is addressed inmore detail in the following.
2.1.2. Cryptographic security
Wewant to address questions such as ‘does a protocolΠ construct the ideal resource + from an initial resource
*?’The resource constructedwill essentially depend onwhich playersmay be honest. For example, in the case of
coinﬂipping, if both parties are honest we expect the protocol to construct a resource that provides each party
with a copy of the same uniformly randombit. But if a party is dishonest, thismight be a too strong requirement.
Instead, we ‘only’ construct a resource that allows the dishonest party to either abort if she does not like the value
of the generated bit, or to bias the bit towards either 0 or 1. [23]
In the case of two party protocols, wewant tomake a statement about three cases: where both parties are
honest, Alice is dishonest, and Bob is dishonest. The resources available to the players are given by a tuple
( )R R R, ,A B , whereR denotes the shared resourcewhen both are honest,RA is available to an honest Bob and
dishonest Alice (presumably, providingmore functionalities to Alice thanR), andRB is shared between an
honest Alice and dishonest Bob. For example,R could be a perfectly fair coin,RA a coin biased in favour of Alice
andRB a coin that Bob can bias (wewill explore this and other examples in section 2.3). Likewise, the constructed
resources are also given by such a tuple ( )S S S, ,A B . The reason for considering three distinct resources as above is
that dishonest players, by virtue of their dishonesty could, in general gain access to additional controls on their
interface.
A two-player protocol1  1 1( ),A B is essentially a pair of converters that can be connected to the
interfaces of the shared resources ( )R R R, ,A B .When both are honest, the resulting system is given by1 1RA B
which denotes the ‘real system’where Alice and Bob share the resourceR and implement their protocols 1A and
1B at their respective interfaces ofR. This should be close to indistinguishable from the ideal resource S.
WhenAlice is dishonest, the protocol 1A is removed in the corresponding real system, becausewe do not
knowwhat protocol a dishonest player would follow.On the ‘real’ sidewe nowhave 1RA B. On the ideal side, we
have SA, but inmost cases 1RA B and SA are trivially distinguishable since Alice’s interface of 1RA B is generally
very different fromher interface of SA: SA provides an idealized interface, which, in the case of coin ﬂipping,
might allowAlice to abort. In the real system, 1RA B Alice receivesmessages fromBob, and could provoke an
abort by sending invalidmessages or not responding.
To allow for the comparison and deﬁne security against dishonest Alice, we require the existence of a
converter (or simulator) TA whichwhen connected toAlice’s interface of SAmakes these two systems close to
indistinguishable. Note that connecting this simulator TA onlymakes Alice weaker, since any operation
performed by the simulator could equivalently be performed by an adversary connected directly to the interface
6
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of the ideal resource. Further, the simulator’s behaviour is independent of the internal workings of the ideal
functionality SA. Security in the case of a dishonest Bob is deﬁned similarly.
Deﬁnition 2 (Cryptographic security [27]).Aprotocol1  1 1( ),A B constructs +  ( )S S S, ,A B from
*  ( )R R R, ,A B within a distance ò, with respect to a set of distinguishers and a set   1 1,A B of converters,
if the following conditions hold:
-
 -
 -



F
T T F
T T F
1 1
  1
  1
( )
( )
( )
d R S
d R S
d R S
, ,
, , ,
, , .
A B
A A B A A
B A B B B
We sometimeswrite* +l1 to denote such constructions. These conditions are illustrated inﬁgure 4.
A possibility result for a construction* +l1 with parameters  F( ), , is a statement of the form: there
exists a protocol 1  1 1( ),A B that F-constructs + from*, i.e.
   -T T F 1 1    1 1( ) ( )d R S, , , , , , , 1A B A B A B
 -T F1( ) ( )d R S, , 2A B A A
 -T F1( ) ( )d R S, . 3A B B B
We then say that* is stronger than + . An impossibility resultwith the same parameters has the form: there exists
no protocol1  1 1( ),A B that F-constructs + from*,
 T T 1 1    ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , either condition 1 , 2 , or 3 does not hold.A B A B
The strength of a security proof depends on the range of the class  of simulators and protocols, the class
of distinguishers used in the security deﬁnition, as well as the assumed and constructed resources* and + . For
construction results, a strong statement has the form ‘we can easily construct + from*, andwe can easily
simulate any cheating behaviour, such that even a very powerful distinguisher could not tell apart our
construction from the ideal system.’Therefore, ideally wewouldwant  to be restricted to converters that are
easy to implement physically, andwewant the set of distinguishers to be as general as possible. For
impossibility results, a strong statement has the form ‘we can always easily distinguish any system constructed
from* from the resource + , even if we allow for very powerful protocols and simulators.’Therefore, we try to
make  to be as general as possible, andwe restrict to correspond to efﬁcient or otherwise easy to implement
distinguishers13.
We do not specify what  and should be used in deﬁnition 2, since this will be different for different
theorems. For example, whenwe prove that no protocol can construct a biased coin ﬂipping resource in
theorem4, the proof holds for converters  T T1 1 , , ,A B A B that have unboundedmemory, unbounded
computational power, and are post-quantum—they are only restricted to be non-signalling. The distinguisher
 that is used to distinguish the real from ideal system runs these converters internally, and thus has the same
computational andmemory requirements as these converters.
Remark 1 (Capturing bounded systems).Note that when a statement wewant to prove involves an existence
quantiﬁer (over the set of converters  for a possibility result, and over the set of distinguishers for an
impossibility proof), it is not necessary to deﬁne the entire set ( ,), it is sufﬁcient to convince oneself that the
corresponding systemdoes belong in this set.We use this to prove impossibility results for computationally
bounded adversaries as well as in the bounded and noisy storagemodels in section 3without deﬁning either the
complexity of the systems or the bound on the storage.We achieve this by ﬁnding a distinguisher that can
distinguish real from ideal systems, and does so by internally running instances of these systems. Thismeans that
security already breaks downwhen the rest of theworld (captured by the distinguisher ) has the samememory
bounds as the honest players and simulator in the protocol. Since amodel needs the distinguisher to have at least
the same power as the players and simulator for a protocol to be composable with itself, our impossibility results
holds for any suchmodel, regardless of the exact bounds on the computational power or storage, and irrespective
of how this is deﬁned.
13
In some settings, wemaywant to givemore power to one of the players. This is the case for blind computation results [28–30], where for
example Bob represents a client with limited computational power andAlice a powerful server (whichmay for example perform arbitrary
quantumoperations). In other examples, wemaywant to restrict honest players to use efﬁcient protocols, while allowing the simulators of
dishonest behaviour to be arbitrary. In these and other cases, we can adjust the sets for T T1 1, , ,A B A B and  to suit the scenario. For the
results in this paper, this will not be necessary.
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2.2. Cryptography in relativistic settings: the causal boxes framework [22]
The abstract cryptography framework [4] follows a top-down approach tomodelling cryptographic security
starting from the highest level of abstraction and proceeding downwards, introducing at each level only the
minimumnecessary speciﬁcations. The composability of abstract systems in the abstract cryptography
frameworkmakes it possible to provide a general, composable security deﬁnition, which is independent from
themodels of communication or computation. It can then be instantiatedwithwhatevermodel is needed—
here, Causal Boxes tomodel relativistic cryptography. In this sectionwe give a brief, informal overview of the
Causal Boxes framework. A formal introductionmay be found in appendix A.
Causal boxes [22] are amodel of information-processing systemswhichmay interact with each other in
arbitrary ways, so long as they respect causality (ﬁgure 5(a)). In broad lines, a causal box 'ˆ is a systemwith input
and outputwires whichmay carry quantumor classical information. A concrete example is a physical box
Figure 4. (a)Whenboth parties are honest, the composition of Alice’s and Bob’s protocol with their shared resourcemust be
F-indistinguishable from the constructed resource S. (b)WhenAlice is dishonest and Bob is honest, the resulting real systemobtained
by removing Alice’s honest protocolmust be F-simulatable by connecting a converter TA (called a simulator) to Alice’s interface of
corresponding ideal system, SA. (c)WhenBob is dishonest andAlice is honest, the resulting real system obtained by removing Bob’s
honest protocolmust be F-simulatable by connecting a converter TB to Bob’s interface of the corresponding ideal system, SB. The
three conditions fromdeﬁnition 2.
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containing some optical elements (like beam-splitters) and connected to opticalﬁber cables: eachwiremay carry
severalmessages at different times (or even in a superposition of different times). A single instance of amessage is
modelled as a quantum state in the jointHilbert space , ( )l2 , where is theHilbert space of the actual
classical/quantummessage, , is a partially ordered set that deﬁnes an ordering on the space ofmessages and
,( )l2 is the sequence spacewith bounded two-norm14. In the simple cases where a quantum state  S  is sent
at awell-deﬁned space–time coordinate ,P , , can be taken to beMinkowski space–time andwe can simply
represent the total state as a pair S( )P, . In this paperwe only need to consider such cases.
Causality condition.Causality requires that outputs produced at space–time point ,P can depend only
on inputs produced in its causal past, a EP P (at this stage, , could be any set of points equippedwith any
partial order to represent causality). In general, a causal box is amap from the space of the inputs to the space of
the outputs that respects this notion of causality15. Composition of causal boxesmay be done in series, in parallel
or through (feedback) loops (ﬁgure 5(a)), and arbitrary composition of causal boxes results in a causal box. A
more technical and detailed description of the framework can be found in appendix A.
Minkowski space–time. In this paperwe apply the formalismofCausalBoxes toMinkowski space–time , ,where
each coordinate corresponds to a vector  ( )P tx, with threedimensionsof space andoneof time. In special
relativity, , has anatural partial order, ‘  E( ) ( )P t P tx x, ,1 1 1 2 2 2 if light can reach x2 from x1 in time t t2 1,
that is if - & & ( )c t tx x2 1 2 1 ,where c is the speedof light.’ In this casewe say that space–timepointP1 is in the
causal past ofP2. If twopoints arenot ordered,we say that they are space-like separated.The causal diamondof apair of
space–timepoints, EP P1 2, denotedby ( )D P P,1 2 is the intersectionof the future light coneofP1with thepast light
coneofP2. This represents themaximal space–time region that canbe affectedby events atP1 andalso affect events at
P2 (ﬁgure5(b)). So that there is no ambiguity in the space–time locations atwhichvarious agents are supposed tomeet
during theprotocol, theplayersmust agreeupona coordinate systemto represent all space–timepoints. Theplayers
are allowed tohavedifferent proper frames todescribe their ownoperations. Security doeshowevernotdependon this
choiceof reference, butonly on thepartial order between thepoints,which is invariantunder aLorenz transformation.
Remark 2 (Range of causal boxes).Causal Boxes canmodel not only quantumprocesses, but also non-
signalling systemswith quantum and classical inputs (for example, PR-boxes are causal boxes) [22]. This will be
useful in security proofs, for example to cover very powerful adversaries, so let us denote by  the set of all
allowed causal boxes in , , and by   the subset of systems that are valid distinguishers.
When proving the possibility result in section 3.1 (theorem 3), we show that
   -T T F1    1( )d R S, , , , ,
where  are just efﬁcient classical systems. Thismeans that even distinguishers bounded only by non-signalling
constraints cannot distinguish the real from ideal systems, and the construction still holds in the presence of
such unrestricted adversaries.
Figure 5. (a)Causal boxes are information-processing systems that respect causality and are closed under composition (serial, parallel
or loops). Arbitrary composition of the causal boxes 'ˆ, :ˆ and -ˆ is a causal box 8ˆ. (b)Minkowski space–time. The causal diamond of
the space–time pointsA andB (shaded in gray)with EA B is denoted by ( )D A B, . In thisﬁgure, point  ( )C D A B, , and pointD is
space-like separated fromA since the future light cone of neither of the points completely contains the future light cone of the other.
14
This is the state space of a single input/outputmessage.More generally, wires which can carrymessages in a superposition of different
numbers and time orderings can be represented by the symmetric Fock space of thismessage space [22]. The symmetry comes from the fact
that there is no special ordering of themessages other than the space–time ordering, which is already given in the state description itself. See
appendix A for further details.
15
Technically, this implies that theremust necessarily be aﬁnite time gap between an input to a causal box and an output that depends on
this inputmodelling the fact that any causal information processing task takes a strictly non-zero amount of time.
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When proving impossibility results in sections 3.2 and 3.3, we show that
   T T F1    1 ( )d R S, , , , ,
where   is any set of systems (e.g. classical, computationally limited orwith boundedmemory) and is a
set of distinguishers with similar requirements. Thismeansﬁrstly that our impossibility results hold even if we
consider protocols that are bounded only by non-signalling constraints (the case were   ). And secondly, if
we consider a settingwhere adversaries are limited, then the results carry over to this setting. For example, our
impossibility proofs also hold in the bounded storagemodel (where  and have boundedmemory) or a
computational setting (where  and are computationally limited). See also remark 1 in section 2.1.
2.3. Two-party resources
Wemaynowdeﬁne the resources needed tomodel and prove our results. In this section, wemodel these
resources by deﬁning their output values and space–time positions given input values and space–time positions.
As in illustration of how this is a special case of themore complete Causal Boxmodel instantiatedwith
Minkowski space, we provide in appendix A.5 a formal deﬁnition of a  as a causal box.
2.3.1. Coin ﬂipping ( )
Acoinﬂip resource provides twodistrustful playerswith a randomcoinﬂip—if they both behavehonestly. If oneof
them is dishonest, then the literature deﬁnes different resources that could be constructed.Themost common, e.g.
[12], is to allow the coinﬂip to beunfair: a dishonest playerwhodoes not like the outcome can abort before the
honest player gets to see this outcome. In [23], the authors deﬁne a biased coinﬂip,where insteadof aborting, a
dishonest party canbias the outcome. In this sectionwe follow [23] anddeﬁne a p-biased coinﬂip  p.Wedeﬁne
anunfair coinﬂip  uf in appendixC.1,whereweprove that 1 2 canbe constructed from  uf .
Deﬁnition 3 (Coinﬂipping,  p).A p-biased coin ﬂip,   { }CF CF CF, ,p Ap Bp , is deﬁned as follows.
CF: Alice receives a uniformly randombit c at space–time location PA, and Bob receives the same bit at another
location PB.
CFB
p: Dishonest Bob receives his uniformly random coin ﬂip output, ac before Alice at EP P A1 and at ;P P2 1
hemay input a bit b (whichmay depend on the value of ac ). Alice receives a bit coA at location ;P PA 2: with
probability p she receives c boA , else  ac coA . Causality requirement: E EP P P A1 2 .
CFA
p: analogous to CFB
p, with the roles reversed.
Note that by deﬁnition ofCF, it should be clear that the uniformly randombit, c is generated independently by
the resourceCF and cannot be correlatedwith anything outside it because the honest resourceCF takes no
inputs that could possibly inﬂuence this output. This is the reasonwhywe label the outputs ofCF at PB and that
of CFB
p atP1 differently (c and ac respectively) even though they are both uniformly distributed, they are
generated independently by different coin ﬂip resources16. Further, a bias of 0means that the coin ﬂip is
uniform, a bias of 1means that the dishonest player has complete control over the outcome, and a bias of p
means that any outcome can occurwith probability atmost  p1 2 2.
2.3.2. Bit commitment ( )
Asmentioned in the introduction, bit commitment is an important cryptographic primitive and its security relates
to its hiding and bindingpropertieswhichwere also introduced in section 1.Here, we formally deﬁnewhat an ideal
bit commitment resource behaves like inMinkowski space–time.
16
In order to reduce the number of variables in the proofs, wemay drop this distinction in places where it is inconsequential. Nevertheless, it
is to be kept inmind.
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Deﬁnition 4 (Bit commitment, ).Abit commitment resource tuple  ≔ { }BC BC BC, ,A B is deﬁned by the
single resourceBC (with BCA and BCB identical toBC), which behaves as follows.
1. Alice selects a classical bit  { }a 0, 1 to commit to and inputs it at her interface of BC at a time of her choice
t1.
2. Bob receives themessage ‘comm’ at time a t t1 1 at his interface, indicating that Alice has committed to a bit.
3. Alice then inputs the command ‘open’ at her interface at a time of her choice t2.
4.Her original commitment ‘a’ is then revealed to Bob at time a t t2 2.
For simplicity, we onlymention the times at which themessages are input and output in deﬁnition 4. This
should naturally also include the location in space of the players.We chose this formalization of the  resource
as it is the closest to the standard, non-relativistic references, e.g. fromBlum’s andDemay et al’s works [12, 23];
we only added the space–time stamps.Nevertheless, our proofs go through even in the casesmentioned by the
reviewer, such as whenAlice chooses the commitment time andBob gets the commitmessage, whenBob can
infer Alice’s commitment, or when agree on all the time stamps beforehand.
In relativistic protocols (like Kent’s [7]), the commitmessagemay be absent, and the commitmentsmay be
valid only within a timewindow (depending on the time taken by light to travel betweenmultiple agents) and
thus, relativistic bit commitment looksmore like a channel with delay, whichwe formalize in the next section.
2.3.3. Channel with delay ( )
In special relativity, unless two agentsmeet at the exact same space–time location to exchangemessages, there is
necessarily aﬁnite communicationdelay between them.A channelwith delay is a cryptographic primitive between
twoparties basedon this physical intuition:Alice sends amessage andBob receives it unalteredwith somedelay.
Deﬁnition 5 (Channel with delay).A channel with delay   ( )CD CD CD, ,A B between a sender Alice and a
receiver Bob is a tuple of resources characterized by four space–time locations, a aE E EP P Q Q, and deﬁned
as follows.
CD: honest Alice inputs a quantum state a into the channel at location P, i.e. the inputmessage is ( )a P, . Honest
Bob receives ( )a Q, at locationQ.
CDA: dishonest Alice inputs a( )a P, . Honest Bob receives ( )a Q, .
CDB: honest Alice inputs ( )a P, . Dishonest Bob receives a( )a Q, .
The trusted regionof the channel is deﬁnedas the causal diamondof aP and aQ : the set a a aE( ) ≔ {D P Q S P, :
aE }S Q .
The dishonest resources CDA and CDB are the same except withP replaced by a ;P P in the former andQ
replaced by a EQ Q in the latter case.
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That is, the  acts as an identity channel on themessage, and as a shift on the space–time stamp.
Furthermore, it allows dishonest players to send (respectively, receive) themessage after (respectively, before)
the honest player. A formal deﬁnition of the causal box that implements the  can be found in appendix A.5.
The trusted region of the  is the regionwhere both players can be sure that the information in the channel
remains secure, evenwhen the other is dishonest; as wewill see, it is the regionwhere the  can be used to
construct other resources such as  (section 3.1).
Relation to relativistic bit commitment protocols. Typically, in anon-relativistic bit commitment resource, Alice is
free to choosewhen toopenher commitment and alsohas the choice tonot openher commitment at all. In
relativistic protocols, however, the commitment time is usually restricted by the time takenby light to travel between
the remote agents, inwhich caseAlice does not have the freedomof choosing arbitrary t1 and t2 as indeﬁnition4:
once t1 isﬁxed, the commitmentmust be opened at the latest by  %t t1 for some%t whichdependson the
protocol.Bob typicallydoes not knowwhetherAlice is committed before time  %t t1 . If the opening is successful,
thenBobknows thatAlice ran the honest protocol at t1, and retroactively decide that she has been committed toher
bit. Furthermore, in some relativistic protocols, e.g. [7], Alice cannot choose tonot open: if she honestly committed
at time t1, then after%t , the commitment is always opened. The  resource fromdeﬁnition 5 captures exactly this,
andhencewe analyze the (im)possibility of extending the delay of such a channel in thiswork.
Other protocols, e.g. [9], additionally offer the possibility toAlice of aborting beforeBob receives the bit towhich
she committed.We thus deﬁne a variationof deﬁnition5 in appendixC.2,where after inputtinghermessage into
the channel, Alicemay still changehermind and abort beforeBob receives it.Weprove in appendixC.2 that our
main results presented in section3 still go throughwith this alternative deﬁnitionof a channelwith delay.
3. Results
3.1. Constructing 
It was shown in [23] that a 1/2-biased coinﬂipping resource can be perfectly constructed from a bit
commitment resource (deﬁnition 4), by using Blum’s protocol [12]. Herewe show that it is in fact possible to
construct an even stronger resource (an unbiased coinﬂip) from a channel with delay.
Theorem3 (Construction  l ).Given a classical channel with delay , there exists a classical protocol
 1  1 1l { },A B that perfectly constructs an unbiased coin ﬂipping resource  0.
The constructed and ideal resources are indistinguishable for any possible distinguisher (including quantum and
non-signalling distinguishers, see remark 2 in section 2.2). The honest protocol as well as the simulator require only
elementary local operations and classical communication.
The protocol is described in deﬁnition 6, and the security proof is given in appendix B.1.
Deﬁnition 6 (Protocol  1 l ).Given a channel with delay   ( )CD, CD , CDA B characterized by
locations a aE E EA A B B (see deﬁnition 5), we deﬁne the following honest protocol  1  1 1l ( ),A B .
1. Alice picks a uniformly randombit, a and sends it throughCD fromher space–time locationA. Bob receives
this bit fromCD at his locationB.
2. Bob meets Alice at S in the trusted region, i.e. the causal diamond a a( )D A B, to pass on Bob’s uniformly
randombit, b.
3. After receiving b fromher agent, Alice computes  a b c and outputs this value at some point ;P SA . If
Bob did not turn up for themeeting at S, she picks a uniform bherself, and outputs  a b c as before.
4. After receiving a from the channel, Bob computes  a b c and outputs the result at a point ;P BB . If Bob
doesnot receiving anything from the channel, he picks a uniform ahimself, andoutputs  a b c as before.
In this case, if both players are honest (and in particular their inputs a and b are uniformly random), then
their output  c a b is also perfectly randomand the protocol succeeds. If one of the players (say Alice) is
dishonest, we only care aboutwhether Bob’s output is uniformly random; but since Bob is honest, b is uniformly
random, and so is c (independently of a).
Note that it is important that the point S in the above protocol lies in the trusted region, otherwise the
protocol would not be secure17. Furthermore, this protocol can be run by a single player on each sidewithout the
need for trusted agents since S lies in the causal future ofA and aA and in the causal past ofB and aB .
17
The existence of the simulators TA and TB used in the proof of theorem3 relies crucially on  a a( )S D A B, .
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In appendix C.2we deﬁne aweaker channel with delay, namely onewhich allowsAlice to abort and prevent
hermessage from reaching Bob, ?.We show in the same appendix (lemma 11), that if the protocol above is
usedwith ? instead of , thenwe construct an unfair coin ﬂip  uf instead of an unbiased one  0.
3.2. Impossibility of  ,  and 
Impossibility of coin ﬂipping. In the previous section, we showed that an unbiased coin ﬂipping resource can be
constructed froma suitable channel with delay. Herewe show that in the absence of any such shared resource, it
is impossible to construct any (biased) coinﬂip resource solely through the exchange ofmessages.
Theorem4 (Impossibility of  ). It is impossible to construct, with   ( )p11
6
, a p-biased coin ﬂipping
resource between twomutually distrusting parties solely through the exchange ofmessages through any relativistic or
non-relativistic protocol, be it classical, quantum or non-signalling.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real from ideal systems has the same complexity andmemory
requirements as the protocol 1 1,A B and simulators T T,A B. In particular, if these are efﬁcient, classical or have
bounded or noisymemory, then so does the distinguisher.
Note that this theorem includes as special case protocols thatmay sendmessages in superpositions of
different causal orders. This follows from the fact that the impossibility holds for any causal boxes, thus in
particular for causal boxes that use such superpositions of causal orders.
The proof of theorem4 can be found in appendix B.2.Here belowwe provide some intuition.
A coinﬂip  p does not only guarantee that the output bit is uniform (or biasedwith probability p), but also
that it is independent of any other bit produced in parallel by some other resource (up to the bias). This is
essential so that a dispute that is resolvedwith a coin ﬂipwould not only be settled fairly, but also independently
from any other dispute. Theman in themiddle attackmentioned in section 1would allow dishonest players to
perfectly correlate the outcome of two coin ﬂips that are expected to be independent: if Alice and Bob run a coin
ﬂipping protocol, Charlie andDanielle run a second one in parallel, and Bob andCharlie collude to forward all
the communication betweenAlice andDanielle, Bob andCharlie could force them to agree on the same coin
ﬂip. The proof of theorem4 consists in showing that this is essentially possible for any protocol that does not use
any resource other than communication between the parties involved. A sketch of themain proof idea is
provided inﬁgure B2 in appendix B.2. It generalizes the techniques used in [4] to prove the analogous result for
the non-relativistic case. Note that even thoughwe deﬁne the p-biased coinﬂip resource symmetrically in
deﬁnition 3 (i.e. both dishonest players have the same bias), all our results can be easily generalised to the
asymmetric case andwewill not consider this explicitly.
Impossibility of  and . Combinedwith theorem 3 andBlum’s construction [12, 23], theorem 4 implies
impossibility of constructing any channel with delay  or any commitment  if no initial resource is shared
by the players.
Corollary 5 (Impossibility of ). It is impossible to construct , with   1
6
, between twomutually distrusting
parties solely through the exchange ofmessages through any classical, quantum or relativistic protocol.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real from ideal systems has the same complexity andmemory
requirements as the distinguisher used in theorem 4 composedwith the protocol 1 1,A B used in theorem 3. In
particular, if these are efﬁcient, classical and have bounded or noisymemory, then so does the distinguisher.
Proof. Follows directly from the impossibility of  in theorem 4 togetherwith the construction of unbiased
 from  (theorem3). ,
Corollary 6 (Impossibility of ). It is impossible to construct  , with   1
12
, between twomutually distrusting
parties solely through the exchange ofmessages through any classical, quantum or relativistic protocol. This rules out
both arbitrarily long and timed commitments.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real from ideal systems has the same complexity andmemory
requirements as the distinguisher used in theorem 4 composedwith the protocol 1 1,A B used in Blum’s protocol
[12, 23]. In particular, if these are efﬁcient, classical and have bounded or noisymemory, then so does the
distinguisher.
Proof. Follows directly from the impossibility of  in theorem 4 togetherwith the construction of 1
2
-biased
 from  using Blum’s protocol [12, 23]. ,
Using the same techniques, we show in appendix C.2 that an abort channel cannot be constructed either.
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3.3. Impossibility of extending delays
Onemaywonder whether, in relativistic settings, players could extend the time commitment of amessage. For
example, if Alice and Bobmoved further apart, perhaps this could increase the delay of a channel. However,
while honest, collaborative agents can always increase the time taken by amessage to travel between themby
simplymoving apart, in a cryptographic settingwhere agents don’t trust each other, they cannot be sure that, for
example, Alice ismoving farther and not closer to Bob.
What our next result shows is precisely that there is noway formutually distrustful agents to ensure that the
time durationwithinwhich themessage in a channel is inaccessible to dishonest players can increase. This notion
is captured by the trusted region of the channel, and is essential for cryptographic security.Moreover, we show
that it is not possible to use several channels with delay to construct a better channel with delay.Weﬁnd that
given n shared channels with delay betweenAlice and Bob, the trusted region of the constructed channel will be
smaller than the trusted region of at least one of the individual channels used. In fact, the result is even stronger:
the trusted region of the constructed channel is contained inside the trusted regionof at least one of the assumed
channels used in the construction. Thismeans themaximal space–time regionwithinwhich the information in
the channel is guaranteed to be secure fromboth dishonest parties cannot be increased evenwith n copies of a
channel. If we view such a channel with delay as a relativistic bit commitment (Alice inputs a bit into the channel
and is then committed to it, but the commitment is only openedwhen the bit arrives with a delay at Bob), this
implies that it is not possible to increase the timewithinwhich the commitment is both hiding and binding even
if n timed commitment resources are given.
Theorem7 (Impossibility of extending ).Givenn channels with delay 1,K, n between two parties, it is
impossible to construct with  - 1
8
a channel a between the two parties with a trusted region that is larger than the
trusted region of all of the individual channels used.
This holds for all protocols 1 1,A B in , which includes inefﬁcient and non-signalling systems. The distinguisher
needed to distinguish the real from ideal system has the same complexity requirements as the protocol 1 1,A B. In
particular, if it is efﬁcient or classical, then so is the distinguisher. Furthermore, if the channels constructed and used
are classical, then the distinguisher also has the same quantummemory requirements as the protocol 1 1,A B.
The proof of theorem7 is given in appendix B.3. Note that this proof includes as special case protocols and
distinguishers thatmay sendmessages in a superposition of going through one channel i or another  j, or
inwhich a channelmay be in a superposition of being used and not used. This follows from the fact that the
impossibility holds for any causal boxes, thus in particular for causal boxes that use such superpositions of causal
orders.
Onemay consider variations of this result inwhich slightly different resources are used or constructed. For
example, one couldwonder whether having channels with delay going fromBob toAlicemay help. It is however
easy to verify from that proof, that these have no impact on the impossibility. Another variationworth
considering is if the channels are abort channels, as deﬁned in appendix C.2.We prove in the same appendix that
one cannot extend the delay of abort channels either.
4.Discussion
The general framework formodelling composable security of relativistic quantumprotocols developed here
naturally lends itself to the study of novel possibility and impossibility results in relativistic cryptography and
could provide key insights into classifying possible and impossible information-processing tasks.
Composability issues raised previously.Composability issues withKent’s 2012 protocol [7] have been brieﬂy
discussed in [8]. A deﬁnitionwhich is labeled ‘composable’ is proposed in [8, appendix B], but it is not derived
using any composable framework. In fact, it is argued in [8] that bit commitment in the bounded and noisy
storagemodels could satisfy this deﬁnition. Since our results carry over to these settings as well, it follows that
either the proposed deﬁnition is not composable or it cannot be satisﬁed.Note that the impossibility of  in the
bounded storagemodel is already hinted at in [20], where the author points out that themodel he developed for
concurrent composition does not guarantee that a protocol is securewhen run in parallel with another instance
of itself.
Superpositions of causal orders.Aunique feature of the causal boxes formalism [22], is that it canmodel
superpositions ofmessages exchanged in a superposition of orders in (space-)time (e.g. the quantum switch
[31]) by assigning different space–time stamps (or superpositions thereof) to differentmessages. Combining this
with the abstract cryptography framework [4], as done in this paper, allows us tomodel security in settingswhere
such superpositions are actively used. For example, this allows us to consider protocols where amessage is in a
superposition of being sent fromAlice to Bob and fromAlice toCharlie, i.e. where Bob andCharlie are in a
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superposition of having received nomessage and onemessage fromAlice. Even for protocols that do not use
such structures, possibility results consider distinguishers that have this capability. And impossibility results
show that even such superpositions of causal orders, the desired resource cannot be constructed. This is the case
for all our results presented in this work.
A known example of a process involving a superposition of temporal orders of operations is the quantum
switch [31]. It was physically realized in [32, 33], and can be represented in theCausal Box framework as shown
in [22]. Further, the quantum switchwas shown to have an operational advantage over ﬁxed ordering of (or
classicalmixtures thereof) operations in solving certain computational tasks [34, 35]. Bymodelling
cryptographic protocols involving such superpositions of orders, one can study the operational advantage
provided by quantumordering ofmessages/operations over classical orderings. Such an approach to studying
causal structures in terms of their operational advantages would be useful for characterising the properties of
physically implementable causal structures. This is still an important open question since there existmore
general frameworks formodelling causal structures, such as the processmatrix framework [36]which predict
causal structures that are logically possible and yet, have no knownphysical implementation.
Error tolerance.Realistic protocols, like those implementedwith quantumpreparations andmeasurements,
always comewith a small probability of error (for example, inKent’s protocol as inQKD schemes, this depends
on the number of quantum states exchanged between the parties). The ideal resources we prove cannot be
constructed are, by deﬁnition, not subject to any errors. But it follows directly from the composable framework
used that impossibility to construct perfect resources (with some error F) implies impossibility to construct
noisy versions of the resources. To see this, consider a resource F that is F-close to  according to the
distinguishing advantage. By the triangle inequality, if a real protocol implements a resource that isΔ-
distinguishable from the ideal , it will be at least F% ( )-distinguishable from F. For example, for an
unbiased  , we have%  1
6
, so it is still impossible to perfectly build any  that has an error tolerance
smaller than that.
Minimal resources for constructions.Our results show that existing bit commitment protocols [7, 9] cannot
construct the target resource  from an assumption of a shared resource. Nevertheless, wemay still look for
initial resources* that allow  to be constructed. It would be interesting to explore theminimal resources
necessary to achieve this. For example, an assumption (or assurance) that dishonest players cannot interact with
third parties is a good candidate for such an initial resource*. It remains open to formalize such a resource*
within the framework and prove that it is sufﬁcient to construct  .We note however that in the classical case
one can construct  assuming aCRS shared between all parties and standard complexity assumptions [16].
Thus, to justify a quantumor relativistic protocol, onewould needweaker assumptions.
Alternative space–time.We have proved our results taking the background physical theory to be special
relativity (in the sense ofMinkowski space–timewith aﬁnite speed of signalling). The results would still hold
even for other space–time geometries with a ﬁxed background causal structure i.e. for different choices of the
partially ordered set , . However, if we consider a general relativistic framework (onewhere the causal order is
notﬁxed until one solves for themetric by considering themass distribution) that is compatible with quantum
mechanics, there could arise situations where the background causal structure itself is subject to quantum
uncertainty and is no longer ﬁxed18. Such causal structures can no longer be explained by a single partially
ordered set , and cannot bemodelledwithin theCausal Boxes framework. In fact, there is currently no
framework that canmodel this and has the properties required to deﬁne cryptographic security19. Thus it
remains open to deﬁne a quantum, general relativistic framework for composable cryptography, and study the
problemof constructing bit commitment using it.
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AppendixA. The causal box framework
The causal box [22] formalismmodels information-processing systems that are closed under composition even
when the order of operations indeﬁnite (such as a superposition of orders) or dynamically determined during a
protocol’s runtime. Similar formalisms (e.g. [39–41]) have been previously developed but they are only suitable
formodelling systemswhere the order ofmessages is predeﬁned, they fail to be closed under compositionwhen
considering simple cryptographic protocols that involve dynamical ordering ofmessages during runtime [22].
In particular, the formalism allows us tomodel quantum causal systems inMinkowski space and construct new
causal systems by composing them. Thismakes it suitable formodelling composable security of relativistic
quantumprotocols as done in this paper.We now review the formal deﬁnitions of the objects of the causal box
framework [22].
A.1.Message space andwires
1. Space of ordered messages: Every message is modelled as a pair, ( )v t, where .v denotes the (classical/
quantum)message and ,t provides ordering information, where , is a countable, partially ordered set.
The space of a singlemessage is thus aHilbert spacewith the orthonormal basis . ,§  {∣ }v t, v t, . For aﬁnite
. and inﬁnite , , thisHilbert space corresponds to ,.  ( )∣ ∣ l2 where ,( )l2 is the sequence space with a
bounded two-norm. Thus §∣t can be seen as a sequencewhich consists of a 1 in position ,t and 0
everywhere else.
2.Wires: The inputs and outputs to a causal box are sent/received through wires which can carry any number
(or a superposition of different numbers) ofmessages of aﬁxed dimension, which deﬁnes the dimension of
thewire20. Thus the state space of awire is deﬁned to be a symmetric Fock space. It ismodelled as a Fock
space to allow for superpositions of different numbers ofmessages and it is a symmetric Fock space since all
ordering information associatedwith the arriving qudits is already contained in the label ,t and given
this label, there is no other ordering on the qudits. For theHilbert space, ,  ( )ld 2 , the
corresponding bosonic Fock space is given as
 , ,   

d
( ( )) ≔ ⨁ ( ( )) ( )l l , 4d
n
n d2
0
2
where  n denotes the symmetric subspace of n and 0 is the one-dimensional space containing the
vacuum state 8§∣ .
For example, the state space corresponding to awireA carrying dA dimensionalmessages is denoted by
  ,,  ( ( ))lA d 2A . The joint space of twowires can bewritten as   , , , A B AB and it can be shown
[22] that for any twoHilbert spaces ,  ( )lA d 2A and ,  ( )lB d 2B ,
 ! ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F H F H F H H . 5A B A B
Isomorphism (5) tells us that each valid state in the combined state space of twowires, one carrying dA
dimensionalmessages and the other carrying dB dimensionalmessages, can bemapped to a valid state in the state
20
For example a two-dimensional wire can carry any number of qubits, or can be in a superposition of carrying 2 and 3 qubits but cannot
carry qutrits.
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space of a single wire carrying dA+dB dimensionalmessages.Hence ,AB, can be interpreted as the state space of a
wire carrying ( )d dA B dimensionalmessages21.
We nowproceed to formally review the deﬁnition of causality that causal boxes satisfy, we ﬁrst deﬁne the
notion of cuts on a partially ordered set , which forms an important part of the deﬁnition.
A.2. Cuts and causality
Deﬁnition 7 (Cuts [22]).Acut of a partially ordered set , is any subset  , such that  ,

-

⋃
t
t , where
, ,- - { }t p p t: . A cut  is bounded if there exists a point ,t such that  , - t . The set of all cuts
of , is denoted as ,( )C and the set of all bounded cuts as ,( )C .
In this paper, we have taken the partially order set , to beMinkowski space–time, this allows us to restrict to
bounded cuts. This is because every cut inMinkowski space–time is a bounded cuts: any two space–time points
(even those that are unordered i.e. space-like separated)necessarily share a common causal future. Note that this
is not true for a general partially ordered set , .
Deﬁnition 8 (Causality function [22]).A function , ,D l( ) ( )C C: is a causality function if it satisﬁes the
following conditions:
  ,     D D D  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C a, , , 6
  ,    D D   º ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C b, , , 6
 ,  D   ( )⧹{ } ( ) ( )C c, , 6
 ,   D      ( ) ( ) ( )C t n t d, , , , 6n
where Dn denotes n compositions ofχwith itself, D D D "◦ ◦n .
Conditions (6a) and (6b) follow from the considerations that: If the output on  and  can be computed
from D( ) and D( ) respectively, the output on   can be computed from  D D( ) ( ), if D( ) is needed
to compute the output on  , then certainly it is needed to compute the output on   . Condition (6c) is
essentially the causal condition that requires that outputs of a causal box can depend only on inputs produced in
its causal past andCondition (6d) is to ensure that a causal box does not produce an inﬁnite number ofmessages
in aﬁnite interval of time (see [22] for details). Deﬁnition 8 is the general deﬁnition of the causality function and
it simpliﬁes for special choices of the set , [22].We are now in a position to review the formal deﬁnition of a
causal box.
A.3. General deﬁnition of a causal box
Deﬁnition 9 (Causal box [22]).A ( )d d,X Y -causal boxΦ is a systemwith inputwireX and outputwireY of
dimension dX and dY
22, deﬁned by a set23 ofmutually consistent (equation (8)), completely positive, trace-
preserving (CPTP)maps (equation (7))
'  ' lD { ( ) ( )} ( )( ) ( )T T CF F: . 7C X C YC C T
Thesemapsmuch be such that for all   , ( )C, with   ,
    , '  ' D◦ ◦ ( )⧹ ⧹ ( )tr tr , 8
where ( )T denotes the set of all trace class operators on the space  and the causality function D( ). satisﬁes all
the conditions of deﬁnition 8.   is the subspace of  , that contains onlymessages in positions  t T
and  ⧹tr traces out themessages occurring at positions in  ⧹ .
Equation (8) can be seen as the combination of the two requirements    '  '◦⧹tr and   , '  ' D◦ ⧹ ( )tr .
Theﬁrst one embodies themutual consistency requirement while the second, that of causality.
21
Conversely, anywireA ofmessages of dimension dA can be split in two sub-wiresA1 andA2 ofmessages of dimensions  d d dA A A1 2 :  , , ,! A A A1 2 . Further, for any subset ( , ,   , ( (! 
_
A A A , where ( , (_ ⧹ and  ((   ( )lA d 2A .
22
It is enough to deﬁne a causal box as amap fromone input wire to one output wire since a single wire of dimension d can always be
decomposed into nwires of dimensions yd d, , n1 with    d d d d... n1 2 using the isomorphismof equation(5).
23
In general, it ismodelled as a set ofmaps and not a singlemap because this allows systems to be includedwhich produce an unbounded
number ofmessages and are thus not well-deﬁned as a singlemap on the entire set , , but only on subsets of , that are upper bounded by a
set of unordered points. For example [22].
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Remark 8.Note that deﬁnition 9 only considers trace-preserving causal boxes. The deﬁnition can be easily
generalised to non-trace preserving causal boxes or sub-normalised causal boxes to account for post-selection.
This is done in [22] by deﬁning a suitable projector on the space of normalised causal boxes.
Further, just like CPTPmaps on quantum states, causal boxes also admit Choi-Jamiołkowski and
Stinespring representations, and in addition, they also admit sequence representations that describe their
sequential action over subsequent, disjoint sets of , .We refer the reader to the original paper [22] for details
regarding these as they are not of particular relevance to the results of this paper.
A.4. Composition of causal boxes
Having deﬁned causal boxes, we are in a position to see how they can be composed. Due to Isomorphism (5), an
input/outputwire to a causal box of dimension d can be split into sub-wires of dimensions yd d d, , , n1 2 such
that    d d d d... n1 2 and similarly, wires can also be combined to form awirewith dimensions equal
to the sumof the dimensions of the individual wires. Taking '( )Ports to represent a particular partition of the
input and outputwires of a causal boxΦ into sub-wires, arbitrary composition of causal boxes can be achieved
by combining the following two steps.
1.Parallel composition: two causal boxes Φ and Ψ can be composed in parallel to obtain a new causal box
(  ' :& whose input and output ports are given by the union of the input and output ports ofΦ andΨ
respectively.
2. Loops: selected output ports of the causal box Γ can be connected with input ports of the same dimension to
form loops.
A classical example of composition through loops can be found inﬁgure A1. The formal deﬁnitions of parallel
composition and loop composition of causal boxes, which generalise thisintuition to the quantum case can be
found in the original paper [22], where it is also shown that causal boxes are closed under these arbitrary
composition operations.
A.5. The channel with delay as a causal box
The channel with delay was deﬁned in section 2.3.3. In this section, we showhow tomodel the channel with
delay using the causal box formalism, i.e. by deﬁning it in terms of a set ofmutually consistentmaps '{ }. Recall
that a channel with delay is deﬁned by the tuple of resources  ≔ { }CD CD CD, ,A B , each of the resources
CD CD, A and CDB can be equivalently described by the causal boxes ' ',CD CDA and 'CDB. In the following, we
consider the channel with delay resource characterised by the 4 space–time points a aE E EA A B B.
Deﬁnition 10 (Causal box 'CD description of the channel with delay resourceCD).  bounded cuts
 , B inMinkowski space , , the causal box      ,'  ' lD { ( ) ( )}( ) ( )T T C:CD CD X Y is deﬁned by the
maps ! ' Dl≔ ◦ ( ) ⧹trCD A B A, with ! !. ,  §  §l [∣ ∣ ∣ ∣] ( )B A A BA B l2 .X andY label the input and output
wires to the causal box, !. denotes the identity operation on theHilbert space . of the quantummessage, ,( )l2
is the sequence space (with bounded two-norm) of the space–time stamps and D( ) is any causality function
that satisﬁes the conditions of deﬁnition 8 and the condition that  D º  ( )B A .
Similarly, the resources CDA and CDB can be deﬁned by replacingAwith aA andBwith aB in deﬁnition 10
respectively. Note that for any subset ( , ,   , ( (!  ˜ , where ( , (˜ ⧹ . Further, a natural
embedding of  ( in  , can be obtained [22] by appending the vacuum state24 to  (
Figure A1.Classical example for loop composition: a systemwith classical inputsA,B and classical outputsC,D can be described by
the probability distribution ∣PCD AB. The new systemobtained by adding a loop from the outputC to inputB is then described by the
distribution   ( ∣ )∣ ∣Q P cd acD A c CD AB and is a valid probability distribution as long as the systemobeys causality [22].
24 (8§∣ ˜ represents the one dimensional subspace of  (˜ that contains the vacuum state.
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( , ( ,!  8§ ∣ ˜
This allows us to equivalently view the trace  ⧹tr for any two cuts   , as the operation of tracing out all the
messages in space–time locations that belong to the cut , but not to the cut  and replacing all of themby the
vacuum state 8§∣ .With this, we can see that in deﬁnition 10,  SD ( )( ) ⧹tr A for an arbitrary input state
 S  D( )( )T X will always result in a state of the form T  §  8§8∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ˜A A A where  .T  ( ), whichwithout
loss of generality, we denote by T  §∣ ∣A A where it is understood that there is ‘nothing’ i.e. the vacuum state 8§∣
at all other space–time locations ,A˜ .
It is easy to verify that 'CD is indeed a causal box i.e. that it satisﬁes equation (8). The left-hand side of the
equation gives, for an arbitrary input state  S  D( )( )T X and any cut   B
5 5 5
5
S S S
T D
T
'  ' 
  8 8
  8 8
DlD D D
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎧
⎨
⎩
( ) ( ) ( )
( ∣ ⟩⟨ ∣) ( )
∣ ⟩⟨ ∣
∣ ⟩⟨ ∣
∣ ⟩⟨ ∣
( )
( )I
B B A D
B B B C
tr tr tr
tr ,
, otherwise
,
, otherwise.
9
CD
C
D C CD
D
D C A B D A
D C
T
T
Similarly, the right-hand side of equation (8) becomes
5 5 5S S S
T D
'  ' 
  8 8
D D DlD D D
⎧
⎨
⎩
( ) ( ) ( )
∣ ⟩⟨ ∣ ( )
∣ ⟩⟨ ∣
( )
( ) ( ) ( )I
B B A C
tr tr tr
,
, otherwise.
10
CD
C
CD
C
C C A B C A C C
T
Sincewe have25  D   ( )B A by deﬁnition 10, and equations (9) and (10) hold for arbitrary input
state ρ, the expressions in equations (9) and (10) are equal giving      '  ' D◦ ◦⧹ ⧹ ( )tr trCD CD as required by
deﬁnition 9 of a causal box. This shows that 'CD of deﬁnition 10 (and similarly 'CDA and 'CDB) is indeed a
causal box.
Remark 9.Note that deﬁnition 10 and the fact that 'CD is a causal box imply that 'CD cannot produce any (non-
vacuum) output on cuts that do not contain the pointB. This is due to the fact that inMinkowski space, for any
cut  with B , we can ﬁnd a cut   containingB. Themutual consistency condition (equation (8))
would then demand that no non-vacuumoutputs are produced in the cut  as the only non-vacuumoutput in
 will be produced at B . Thus it is enough to deﬁne 'CD only on cuts that includeB as done in deﬁnition 10.
Appendix B. Proofs of all results
B.1. Constructing 
Theorem3 (Construction  l ).Given a classical channel with delay , there exists a classical protocol
 1  1 1l { },A B that perfectly constructs an unbiased coin ﬂipping resource  0.
The constructed and ideal resources are indistinguishable for any possible distinguisher (including quantum and
non-signalling distinguishers, see remark 2 in section 2.2). The honest protocol as well as the simulator require only
elementary local operations and classical communication.
Proof.The protocol  1 l (deﬁnition 6) constructs  0 from  iff all three conditions ofﬁgure B1 are
satisﬁed. The condition ofﬁgure B1(a) trivially holds. To see that the conditions inﬁgures B1(b) and (c) also
hold, consider the following simulators.
TA is deﬁned as follows.
1. Receive the input a at the space–time location aA at the outer interface. If no a is received, pick one
uniformly at random.
2.On receiving input c atP2 at the inner interface, output  b a c at the outer interface at S.
25
Note that the implication  D º  ( )B A follows from the deﬁnition of the causality functionwhile the implication
 D º ( )A B follows from the fact that for any  D( ) A, the causal box 'CD when acting on an arbitrary input state ρ, always
produces an output on a cut containingB (by deﬁnition).
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For the above construction of TA towork, bothP2 and aA must lie in the causal past of S. Since S lies in the
trusted region, a EA S necessarily holds. Since there are no constraints on the space–time points at which CFA0
can produce an output, we can alwaysmake it output at a point EP S2 .
TB is deﬁned as follows.
1. Receive the input b at the space–time location S at the outer interface. If no b is received, pick one uniformly
at random.
2.On receiving input c atP1 at the inner interface, output  a b c at the outer interface at aB .
For the above construction of TB towork, bothP1 and Smust lie in the causal past of aB . Again, S being in the
trusted regionensures that aES B necessarily holds and aEP B1 holds since there are no restrictions on the
space–time points at which CFB can produce an output.
It is easy to see that for the abovementioned constructions of the simulators TA and TB, the real and ideal
systems ofﬁgures B1(a)–(c) are perfectly indistinguishable (for any distinguisher ) since a, b and c always
satisfy the condition that any two of them sumbit-wise to the third. Further, Alice can learn the value of both bits
a and b before Bob does but she cannot bias the value of Bob’s output, a b in anyway.Neither can she prompt
Bob to abort the protocol after learning the value of her bit a, because she has to send a into the channel before he
receives b at the point S (by the non empty trusted region condition). Hence the protocol perfectly constructs an
unbiased coinﬂipping resource  0 from a channel with delay . ,
Figure B1. (a)Honest Alice and Bob: 1 1 xCD CFA B 0 (b)Dishonest Alice: T A such that T1 xCD CFA B A0 A 0 . (c)Dishonest Bob:
T B such that T1 xCD CFA B B0 0 B. Conditions for constructibility of a fair and unbiased coin ﬂip  0 from a channel with delay  .
Since the coin ﬂip has p 0 the biasing bit that a dishonest partymay input has no effect, sowe do not draw it.
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B.2. Impossibility of 
Theorem4 (Impossibility of  ). It is impossible to construct, with   ( )p11
6
, a p-biased coin ﬂipping
resource between twomutually distrusting parties solely through the exchange ofmessages through any relativistic or
non-relativistic protocol, be it classical, quantum or non-signalling.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real from ideal systems has the same complexity andmemory
requirements as the protocol 1 1,A B and simulators T T,A B. In particular, if these are efﬁcient, classical or have
bounded or noisymemory, then so does the distinguisher.
Proof. For the construction to be valid, all conditions ofﬁgure B2must hold. As explained in theﬁgure caption,
theﬁrst step is to combine the three conditions and use the triangle inequality to obtainﬁgure B2(d).
Next wewill show that for any causal order of themessages c, ac , b and ab inﬁgure B2(d), the best possible
classical, quantumor non-signalling strategy of T leads to a distinguishing advantage of at least ( )p11
2
between TCF CFBp Ap andCF.We present here only the optimal strategy—it is a straight-forward if tedious
calculation to verify that all other causal orderings and possible input–output correlations in each case do not
yield a lower distinguishing advantage.
The simulator’s task is to ensure to the best of its capabilities that co
A and co
B are equal. The causal order of the
messages that provide T with themaximum information to achieve this task is the one depicted by the directed
acyclic graph (DAG)26 inﬁgure B3, where T can learn the values of c and ac ﬁrst and accordingly correlate the
values of b and ab which are then input to CFAp and CFBp respectively. In this case, the best possible strategy that
the simulator could adoptwould be onewhere it produces the input–output correlations  a b b c or
 a  ab b c all the time. The probability that coA equals coB for such a strategy (say,  a b b c) is:
       v v
   v
  v
  v
  v
       
 
a a a a
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a
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2 2
Adistinguisher connected to TCF CFBp Ap orCF can access the two outputs produced at the outer interfaces of
these systems. If the distinguisher guesses TCF CFBp Ap every time the two outputs differ in value and TCF CFBp Ap or
CFwith uniformprobability every time the two outputs are equal, the distinguishing advantage would be:
 . .T v  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )d CF CF CF P c c p3 , 1
2
1 . 11B
p
A
p
o
A
o
B
This distinguishing advantage ò is equal to zero onlywhen p 1 (totally biased coin) and thus, for a non-trivial
p, it is not possible tomake the distinguishing advantage ò arbitrarily small.
The distinguisher used to distinguish the left and right-hand sides inﬁgure B2(d) is quite a trivial system, that
only needs one bit ofmemory and compare the two output bits. The existence of such a distinguisher with
advantage 3ò implies that there exists another distinguisher with advantage F that can distinguish the left and
right-hand sides from either ﬁgures B2(a)–(c).We now go through the steps of this argumentmore slowly, to
determine the exact complexity (both in terms ofmemory and computation) of the distinguisher thatwe have
proven to exist. To constructﬁgure B2(d) from the threeﬁrst conditions inﬁgure B2, we use the following two
arguments several times.
Theﬁrst is the triangle inequality, namely that
x
x x
F
F F Fa  a
⎫
⎬
⎭
⟹
R S
S T
R T .
Note that this holds for individual distinguishers, hence the contrapositive states that if there exists a
distinguisher that can distinguishR fromTwith advantage F F a, then exactly the same distinguisher can
distinguish eitherR from Swith advantage F or S fromTwith advantage Fa.
26
DAGs arewidely used in the literature to represent causal structures. For classical causal structures (as is the case here, given that the
inputs and outputs toσ are classical bits), the nodes (circles) represent randomvariables and the edges (arrows) represent causal inﬂuences.
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The second generic argument—contractivity—uses the fact that for any resources R S, and anyother systemα,
B Bx xF F⟹R S R S.
Unlike the previous argument, this one involves a change of distinguisher, namely if for some ,
 B B F( )d R S, , then  FB ( )d R S, , where B corresponds to the composition of  withα.
Figure B2. (a) 1 1 x CFA B (b)Dishonest Alice: T T 1 x CF:A B AbA (c)Dishonest Bob: T T 1 x CF:B A Bb B (d) T :AB
T xCF CF CFBb AB Ab 3 Impossibility of coin ﬂipping: proof sketch. For a p-biasedCoin Flipping to be ò-constructible solely through
the exchange ofmessages, conditions (a)–(c)must be satisﬁed. The composition (1) of the system on the lhs of (c) (1A)with that on the
lhs of (b) (1B) yields the system on the lhs of (a) (1 1A B)which gives the condition (d) for the corresponding right hand sides (2)withT T TAB B A. To prove impossibility, we show in appendix B.2 that for any causal order of themessages c, ac , b and ab , the best possible
classical, quantumor non-signalling strategy of T leads to a distinguishing advantage of at least   ( )p3 11
2
between TCF CFBp Ap
andCF in (d). Note that if the parties had access to a shared resource *, a condition analogous to (d) could not be obtained by
composing (b) and (c), and the same impossibility proofwould no longer be applicable.
Figure B3.The causal ordering of inputs and outputs of simulator T (see ﬁgure B2(d)) that provide it themaximum information
about the outputs co and aco .C, aC ,B and aB ( { })0, 1 represent the randomvariables of which the corresponding lower case alphabets
are speciﬁc instances of. In addition,B and aB may causally inﬂuence each other, but this does not offer any advantage to T because the
optimal strategy is where both b and ab depend on c (or ac ).
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Wenow start with the existence of the trivial distinguisher  forﬁgure B2(d) described above, andwhich
has  T ( )d CF CF CF, 3Bp Ap . From the triangle inequality we know that one of the three following conditions
must hold
 1 1 ( ) ( )d CF, , 12A B
 T1 1 1 ( ) ( )d CF , , 13A A Ap A B
 T T T1 ( ) ( )d CF CF CF, . 14Bp B A Ap A A Ap
If it is (12) that holds, we are done, sincewe have a trivial distinguisher that can break the condition from ﬁgure
B2(a). If it is either (13) or (14), then using the contractivity rule, weﬁnd that either 1A can distinguish the left
and right-hand sides ofﬁgure B2(b) or T CFA Ap can distinguish the left and right-hand sides ofﬁgure B2(c).
Thus, both the computational requirements andmemory requirements of the distinguisher are the same as
the computational andmemory requirements of either1A or T CFA Ap. ,
The proof of theorem4 is completely general and applies to quantumand non-signalling protocols as well. The
apparent ‘classicality’ of the proof is due to the fact that all inputs and outputs are classical bits as per the
deﬁnition of the resources used.However, we only talk about the input–output correlations produced by the
simulator T and not the internalmachinery used to produce these correlations, which could be classical,
quantumor non-signalling and the impossibility holds for all classical, quantum and non-signalling strategies
that T could adopt to produce these correlations. A particular input–output correlation could be generated
throughmany different strategies but it turns out in this particular case that there exists a simple classical strategy
that perfectly produces these correlations (look at the value of c and set  a b b c all the time), which is whywe
use correlations produced by T and strategy adopted by T quite interchangeably. But onemust keep inmind that
this in noway restricts the simulator to classical strategies.
B.3. Impossibility of extending delays
Theorem7 (Impossibility of extending ).Givenn channels with delay 1,K, n between two parties, it is
impossible to construct with  - 1
8
a channel a between the two parties with a trusted region that is larger than the
trusted region of all of the individual channels used.
This holds for all protocols 1 1,A B in , which includes inefﬁcient and non-signalling systems. The distinguisher
needed to distinguish the real from ideal system has the same complexity requirements as the protocol 1 1,A B. In
particular, if it is efﬁcient or classical, then so is the distinguisher. Furthermore, if the channels constructed and used
are classical, then the distinguisher also has the same quantummemory requirements as the protocol 1 1,A B.
Proof. Let  y, , n1 denote the n given channels with   ( )CD CD CD, ,i i Ai Bi and associated locationsa aE E EP P Q Qi i i i. Our goal is to construct a channel a, characterized by points a aE E EP P Q Q, given
those channels and additional (direct) communication taking place in a space–time regionR. The conditions
given in ﬁgure B4must be satisﬁed such that ò is a small, non-negative number  distinguishers   . In the
followingwewrite  &"&CD CD CDn1 to denote the resource consisting of the parallel composition of the n
resources CDi that are available to Alice and Bob (similarly CDA and CDB for dishonest Alice and Bob
respectively).
Note that for each channel with delay, there exists a converter EAi such that E CD CDAi Ai i: this is simply a
system that takes the input a fromAlice at position Pi and outputs it at position aPi . Let E E E &"&A A An1 denote
the parallel composition of these converters such that E CD CDA A .
From ﬁgure B4(c)wehave
 

T E E T
E T
1 x 1 1 x 1
1 1 x 1
a a
a
⟹
⟺
( )
CD CD CD CD
CD CD .
15
A B A A A A A B A A A A
A B A A A A
If we look at the right-hand side of (15), the joint system E T1A A A produces an output at position aP , but nothing
after. Hence, communication that does not reach TA before aP cannot inﬂuence the output and is not relevant to
the output of E T1A A A. Let?A denote a converter that blocks all channels i with _a aP Pi and also blocks all
communication in the regionR at points _ aP PR .We then have E T E T1 ?  1A A A A A A A. Combining this with
ﬁgure B4(c), (15), and ﬁgure B4(a), we get
  E E T E T1 ? 1 x 1 ? a  1 a x 1 1 x aCD CD CD CD CD ,A A A A B A A A A A A A A A A B
fromwhichwe conclude that
1 ? 1 x a ( )CD CD . 16A A B 3
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Wenow turn our attention toﬁgure B4(b). Similarly to the argument above, we deﬁne a converter EB such
that E CD CDB B and a converter?B that blocks exactly the same channels and points as?A, but which is
plugged into Bob’s interface.We then get from ﬁgure B4(b) that
E T E1 ? 1 x a ? 1 ( )CD CD . 17A B B B B B B B B B
If we look at the left-hand side of (17), we see that E ?  ?  ?CD CD CDB B B B A , hence it follows from (16) and
(17) that
T Ea ? 1 x a ( )CD CD . 18B B B B B 4
Equation (18) can only holdwith   1 8 if information ﬂows from the left interface of aCDB to the right
interface of 1B. Communication between aCDB and TB only occurs in position aQ , so for themessage tomake its
way through to1B, theremust also be communication between TB and1B at some point a;P QC . The regionR
cannot be used for this, as a aEP Q and?B blocks all communication after aP . The only remaining option is for
there to exist a channel i with a a;Q Qi andwhich is not blocked by?B, i.e. a aEP Pi . But in this casewe
would have a a a aE E EP P Q Qi i , i.e. the trusted region of i would contain the trusted region of a.
Figure B4. (a) 1 1 x a& &CD CD CD...A n B1 (b) T B such that  T1 x a& &CD CD CD...A B Bn B B1 .(c) T A such that
 T1 x a& &CD CD CD...A An B A A1 . Conditions for building a channel with delay a out ofn channelswithdelay  ,..., n1 .
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Toﬁnish the proof, we still need to analyze the complexity of the distinguisher used to distinguish the real
and ideal systems. The proof assumes that the protocol is secure, and then concludes that (18)must hold, which
implies that the trusted region of the constructed channelmust be contained in the trusted region of one of the
assumedchannels. Taking the contrapositive, we assume that the constructed a has a larger trusted region
than the assumed channels, which implies that there exists a distinguisher that can distinguisher the left and
right-hand sides of (18), which in turn implies that there exists a distinguisher that can distinguisher the real
from ideal in one of the equations fromﬁgure B4.Wewill now go through the arguments of the proof to
determine the complexity of this distinguisher that we have proven to exist.
The systems on the left and right-hand sides of (18) just take amessage as input and output amessage of the
same dimension. aCD performs an identity operation on the value of themessage, whereas T Ea ? 1CDB B B B B
must trace out the input and output some ﬁxed state, since by assumption a has a larger trusted region than
the assumed channels, so there is no communication fromAlice’s interface to Bob’s interface. If the channel is
classical, an optimal system that distinguishes a ﬁxed (possibly probabilistic) output from the identity channel,
inputs aﬁxedmessage (that has low probability of being output by the channel on the left-hand side of (18)), and
checks to see if the samemessage is output. This has probability of success at least 1/2, and requires nomemory
and one equality check. If the channel is quantum, the distinguishermay perform the same (which then involves
preparing one quantum state and performing a projectivemeasurement). Alternatively, the distinguishermay
input half of an EPRpair, keep the puriﬁcation, and perform the projectivemeasurement on the joint systemof
the output and the puriﬁcation, which has a probability of success of at least 3/4, but now involves quantum
memory of the size of themessage.
There are two generic arguments used in the proof to construct the distinguisher for one of the equations in
ﬁgure B4 from the distinguisher for (18). Theﬁrst is the triangle inequality, namely that
x
x x
F
F F
⎫
⎬
⎭
⟹
R S
S T
R T .2
Note that this holds for individual distinguishers, hence the contrapositive states that if there exists a
distinguisher that can distinguishR fromTwith advantage F2 , then exactly the same distinguisher can distinguish
eitherR from S or S fromTwith advantage F.
The second generic argument uses the fact that for any resources R S, and any converterα,
B Bx xF F⟹R S R S.
Unlike the previous argument, this one involves a change of distinguisher, namely if for some ,  B B ( )d R S,
F, then  FB ( )d R S, , where B corresponds to the composition of  withα. This was used several times in
the proof with B E 1 ?A A A, B E 1A A, and B E ? 1B B B. Putting this together, we prove that there exists a
distinguisher than can distinguish at least one of the pairs of systems from ﬁgure B4, and this distinguisher has
the same computational requirements as either 1A or 1B alongwith one extrameasurement needed to
distinguish the left and right-hand sides of (18) (since δ and? and forward and trace outmessages, respectively,
they do not perform any computation). Furthermore, if the channels are classical, then the distinguisher has the
same quantummemory requirements as either1A or1B, since δ and?do not require any quantum
memory. ,
AppendixC.Unfair resources
C.1.Unfair coinﬂipping
In section 2.3.1, we deﬁned the p-biased coinﬂipping resource tuple   { }CF CF CF, ,p Ap Bp . Herewe deﬁne
another variation, the unfair coin ﬂipping resource tuple  uf and prove that a 1/2-biased coinﬂip resource
1 2 can be constructed from it. Then, by reduction, theorem7 implies the impossibility of unfair coin ﬂipping
solely through the exchange ofmessages.
Deﬁnition 11 (Unfair coinﬂipping,  uf ).An unfair coin ﬂip   ( )CF CF CF, ,A Buf uf uf has the same resource
CF as  p, and CFAuf and CFBuf are given by:
CFB
uf : Bob receives a uniformly randombit c at location P1. At location ;P P2 1, he can input a bit  ? ?{ }b ,
thatmay depend on the value of c received at P1. Alice then receivesmessage co
A at the location ;P PA 2
depending onBob’s input b atP2: if  ?b , then  ?coA , else c coA i.e. dishonest Bob can prompt an
abort (?) onAlice’s interface by setting  ?b .
CFA
uf : analogous to CFB
p, with the roles reversed.
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This is illustrated in ﬁgureC1.
Lemma10.There exists a protocol  1  1 a 1 al { },A Buf 1 2 that perfectly constructs a 1/2-biased coin ﬂipping
resource 1 2 from an unfair coin ﬂipping resource  uf .
The constructed and ideal resources are indistinguishable for any possible distinguisher (including quantum and
non-signalling distinguishers). The honest protocol as well as the simulator require only elementary local operations
and classical communication.
Proof. In the following, wewill drop the space–time labels corresponding to themessages to avoid unnecessary
annotations and it is easy to see that there exist space–time labels for eachmessage involved such that the
construction presented below is satisﬁed.We deﬁne the honest protocol  1  1 a 1 al { },A Buf 1 2 as follows.
1. Receive the coin ﬂip outcome from the corresponding interface of the unfair coin ﬂipping resource  uf at
the inner interface.
2. If this outcome has a bit value (say c), output c at the outer interface. If this outcome is an abort (?), then
output c 0u or c 1u eachwith probability p 1 2 at the outer interface.
 1 luf 1 2 perfectly constructs a 1/2-biased coinﬂipping resource for the following simulators (the same
for SimA and SimB).
1. Receive the output bit ac from the biased coin ﬂipping resource on the inner interface and output the same
bit at the outer interface.
2. Upon receiving the additional input of ? or ? at the outer interface, forward a  ab c to the resource at the
inner interface if this input is not an abort (?) and forward a  a  a ¯b c c 1 to the resource if the input at
the outer interface is an abort (?).
One can easily verify that the real and ideal systems are identical, for convenience, we have drawn this in
ﬁgureC2. ,
C.2. Abort channel
In section 2.3.3, a  is deﬁned such that onceAlice inputs hermessage atP (respectively, aP , if she is dishonest),
Bob is guaranteed to receive it atQ (or aQ if he is dishonest). In this sectionwe consider a version of a channel
with delay inwhichAlicemay additionally abort, and prevent Bob fromgetting hermessage.We call this an
abort channel, andwrite ?.
Deﬁnition 12 (Abort channel, ?).An abort channel  ? ?( )CD CD CD, ,A B between a sender Alice and a
receiver Bob is a tuple of resources characterized byﬁve space–time locations, a aE E E EP P R Q Q.CD and
CDB are deﬁned identically to a standard  (deﬁnition 5). ?CDA is deﬁned as follows.
?CDA : Dishonest Alice inputs a( )a P, . Shemay also input ?( )R, . If she input ?( R, ), Bob does not receive
anything.Otherwise, Bob receives ( )a Q, .
Nearly the same protocol as used in theorem3 can be used to construct an unfair coin ﬂip from an abort
channel.
Lemma11 (Construction  l? uf ).Given a classical abort channel ?, there exists a classical protocol
1  1 1l? { },CF A Buf that perfectly constructs an unfair coin ﬂipping resource  uf .
FigureC1.Anunfair coinﬂip resourcewith honest Alice and dishonest Bob.
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The constructed and ideal resources are indistinguishable for any possible distinguisher (including quantum and
non-signalling distinguishers). The honest protocol as well as the simulator require only elementary local operations
and classical communication.
Proof.The protocol is the same as the one used to construct  0 from , except that if Bob does not receive
anything from the channel, he outputs? instead of picking a uniform ahimself. The simulator TA has to be
changed in the sameway: if it does not receive an input a( )a A, or if it recives a( )a A, , but later gets an abort?
(which is now allowed by ?), it notiﬁes the resource ?A to abort and output? at Bob’s interface. Drawing
up aﬁgure similar toﬁgure B1, one can see that here toowe have perfect security. ,
It then follows from theorem4 that an abort channel cannot be constructedwithout any setup assumptions
either.
Corollary 12 (Impossibility of ?). It is impossible to construct ?, with   1
12
, between twomutually
distrusting parties solely through the exchange ofmessages through any classical, quantum or relativistic protocol.
The distinguisher required to distinguish the real form ideal systems has the same complexity andmemory
requirements as the distinguisher used in theorem 4 composedwith the protocols used in lemmas 10 and 11. In
particular, if these are efﬁcient, classical and have bounded or noisymemory, then so does the distinguisher.
Proof. Lemma 11 constructs  uf from ?, and lemma 10 constructs 1 2 from  uf . Thus, the
impossiblity of constructing  p from theorem4 immediately implies the impossibility of constructing
?. ,
Finally, we can show that theorem7 also holds for abort channels.
FigureC2. (a)When both parties are honest, the outcomes of the unfair resource CFuf are never equal to ? and the protocols 1A and1B simply forward the bit c received at the inner interface to their outer interface. This is a perfect construction since the honest
resources CFuf and CF1 2 are the same. (b)The simulator SimB for dishonest Bob simply forwards ac received at its inner interface to
its outer interface and sets a  ab c if it receives? at the outer interface and a  a¯b c otherwise. Now the protocol 1A may also receive
the abort input ? from the unfair CF resource, inwhich case it forwards the uniformly randombit cuwhich equals either 0 or 1 each
with probability 1/2 and simply forwards the input c from the unfair CF resource otherwise. The construction is perfect because the
probability distribution of inputs and outputs from the real system is the same as the input and output probability distribution of the
ideal system and hence the two are perfectly indistinguishable.More speciﬁcally, whenever a dishonest player does not abort, the
outputs at both interfaces will be equal to an independently generated, uniformly randombit (labelled as c for the real system and ac
for the ideal system. If the dishonest player aborts, the two outputs will be equal to an independently generated, uniformly randombit
(c or ac )with a probability of 1/2 and theywill be uniformly randombut completely uncorrelated (cu and c for the real system and ab
and ac for the ideal system)with a probability of 1/2. The argument for dishonest Alice is identical. Constructibility of a 1/2-biasedCF
resource from anunfair CF resource.
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Lemma13 (Impossibility of extending ?).Givenn abort channels with delay ?1 ,K, ?n between two
parties, it is impossible to construct with  - 1
8
a channel a? between the two parties with a trusted region that is
larger than the trusted region of all of the individual channels used.
This holds for all protocols 1 1,A B in , which includes inefﬁcient and non-signalling systems. The distinguisher
needed to distinguish the real from ideal system has the same complexity requirements as the protocol 1 1,A B. In
particular, if it is efﬁcient or classical, then so is the distinguisher. Furthermore, if the channels constructed and used
are classical, then the distinguisher also has the same quantummemory requirements as the protocol 1 1,A B.
The proof of lemma 13 is identical to the proof of theorem7 found in appendix B.3, because the
distinguisher used runs the honest protocol Pi Pi,A B, and  and ? only differ on the adversarial interface
(a dishonest Alice can provoke an abort). Sowe omit it.
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